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The purpose of this paper is to measure the potential impact of business-sector concentration on 
economic capital for loan portfolios and to explore a tractable model for its measurement. The 
empirical part evaluates the increase in economic capital in a multi-factor asset value model for 
portfolios with increasing sector concentration. The sector composition is based on credit 
information from the German central credit register. Finding that business sector concentration 
can substantially increase economic capital, the theoretical part of the paper explores whether 
this risk can be measured by a tractable model that avoids Monte Carlo simulations. We analyze 
a simplified version of the analytic value-at-risk approximation developed by Pykhtin (2004), 
which only requires risk parameters on a sector level. Sensitivity analyses with various input 
parameters show that the analytic approximation formulae perform well in approximating 
economic capital for portfolios which are homogeneous on a sector level in terms of PD and 
exposure size. Furthermore, we explore the robustness of our results for portfolios which are 
heterogeneous in terms of these two characteristics. We find that low granularity ceteris paribus 
causes the analytic approximation formulae to underestimate economic capital, whereas 
heterogeneity in individual PDs causes overestimation. Indicative results imply that in typical 
credit portfolios, PD heterogeneity will at least compensate for the granularity effect. This 
suggests that the analytic approximations estimate economic capital reasonably well and/or err 
on the conservative side. 
Keywords: sector concentration risk, economic capital   
JEL-Classification: G18, G21, C1    
 
Non Technical Summary 
An unbalanced exposure distribution of a loan portfolio, either across regional or business 
sectors, generally increases the associated credit risk. If credit risk is measured by a single 
systematic risk factor, sector concentration is usually not accounted for. The purpose of this 
paper is twofold. The empirical part measures the potential impact of business-sector 
concentration on the economic capital (or unexpected loss) of several loan portfolios. The sector 
composition of these portfolios is based on information from the German central credit register 
(Millionenkreditmeldewesen) on the sector composition of real bank portfolios. In this way it is 
ensured that our results are representative of real banks.  
The model used in the empirical part requires Monte Carlo simulations for the calculation of 
economic capital, which can be noisy and time-consuming for the high-confidence levels 
typically used for the calculation of economic capital for credit risk. Therefore, in the theoretical 
part of the paper we explore a simpler, more tractable model for measuring portfolio risk which 
has a closed-form solution for economic capital and only requires input parameters, in particular 
exposure size and default probability, on a sector level. The model assumptions of PD 
homogeneity in every sector and fully diversified idiosyncratic credit risk are indeed not met by 
real credit portfolios. Indicative results nevertheless suggest that the analytic approximation still 
estimates economic capital reasonably well for typical credit portfolios and/or errs on the 
conservative side.   
 
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Forderungskonzentrationen in einem Kreditportfolio, entweder in bestimmten geografischen 
Regionen oder in Industrie- bzw. Dienstleistungssektoren, erhöhen im Allgemeinen das 
Portfoliorisiko. Wird das Kreditrisiko mit einem Ein-Faktor-Modell gemessen, bleiben 
Sektorkonzentrationen üblicherweise unberücksichtigt. Das Diskussionspapier gliedert sich in 
einen empirischen und einen theoretischen Teil. Im empirischen Teil wird die mögliche 
Auswirkung von Branchenkonzentrationen auf das ökonomische Kapital (oder den unerwarteten 
Verlust) von ausgewählten Kreditportfolios bestimmt. Die Sektorverteilung dieser Portfolios 
beruht auf Informationen über die Sektorverteilung realer Bankportfolios aus dem 
Millionenkreditmeldewesen. Diese Datenbasis soll sicherstellen, dass unsere Ergebnisse 
repräsentativ für reale Banken sind. 
Das im empirischen Teil verwendete Modell erfordert Monte-Carlo-Simulationen, welche bei 
den hohen Konfidenzniveaus, die typischerweise für die Bestimmung des ökonomischen 
Kapitals für Kreditrisiken verwendet werden, verrauscht und zeitaufwändig sein können. Aus 
diesem Grund untersuchen wir im theoretischen Teil ein einfacheres Modell zur Bestimmung 
des Portfoliorisikos, welches eine geschlossene Näherungsformel für das ökonomische Kapital 
liefert und nur Eingangsparameter, insbesondere Forderungshöhe und Ausfallwahrschein-
lichkeit, auf Sektorebene verlangt. Zwar sind die in diesem Modell getroffenen Annahmen 
homogener Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten innerhalb der Sektoren und eines vollständig 
diversifizierten firmenspezifischen Risikos in realen Kreditportfolios so nicht erfüllt. Die 
Ergebnisse unserer Untersuchungen deuten aber gleichwohl an, dass die Näherungsformel auch 
in typischen Kreditportfolios noch relativ gute bzw. konservative Näherungswerte für das 
ökonomische Kapital liefert.  
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The failure of not recognizing diversification within banks' credit portfolios was a key 
criticism of the 1988 Basel Accord. The minimum regulatory capital requirements (Pillar 1) 
even in the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of the Basel Framework of June 2004, 
however, still do not differentiate between portfolios with different grades of diversification. 
Recognizing that banks’ portfolios can exhibit credit risk concentrations, Basel II stipulates 
that this risk be addressed in the supervisory review process (Pillar 2), thus creating a need for 
an appropriate methodology to measure this risk.  
Concentration risk in banks’ credit portfolios arises either from an excessive exposure to 
certain names (often referred to as name concentration or coarse granularity) or from an 
excessive exposure to a single sector or to several highly correlated sectors (i.e. sector 
concentration). In the past, financial regulation and previous research have focused mainly on 
the first aspect of concentration risk.
2 Therefore, in this paper our focus is on sector 
concentration risk, although granularity is also analyzed. Sectors are defined in the following 
as business sectors. Sectors defined by geographical regions are not considered in this paper 
but our methodology would still be applicable in that case.  
The critical role credit risk concentration has played in past bank failures has been 
documented in the literature.
3 Therefore, the importance of prudently managing sectoral 
concentration risk in banks’ credit portfolios is generally well recognized. However, existing 
literature does not provide much guidance on how to measure sectoral concentration risk. 
Consequently, whether particular levels of concentration need to be translated into an 
additional capital buffer remains an open question.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, in the empirical part, we 
measure economic capital in a CreditMetrics-type multi-factor model and evaluate how 
important the increase in economic capital is in a sequence of portfolios with increasing sector 
                                                      
1   For their comments we thank, Alexandre Adam, Marc Carey, Marc De Ceuster, Michael Gordy, Thilo Liebig, 
Janet Mitchell, Joël Petey, Peter Raupach, Andrea Resti, participants in the Research Task Force of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision as well as participants at the 2006 AFSE conference on “Recent 
Developments in Financial Economics”, the 2006 European Banking Symposium, the 6th Annual Bank 
Research Conference (FDIC/JFSR), the 2006 C.R.E.D.I.T. Conference “Risks in Small Business Lending”, the 
13th Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF), and the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Financial 
Management Association.  We thank Eva Lütkebohmert, Christian Schmieder and Björn Wehlert for their 
invaluable support in compiling the German credit register data and Julien Demuynck and Jesus Saurina for 
providing us with data from the French and the Spanish credit registers. 
  The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the 
National Bank of Belgium. 
2    See EU Directive 93/6/EEC, Joint Forum (1993) and Gordy (2003). 
3   See, for example, BCBS (2004a).  
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concentration. The analysis is based on portfolios which were constructed from German 
central credit register data on 2224 banks. The benchmark portfolio reflects the average 
business-sector distribution of the banking system as some of the more concentrated portfolios 
mirror sector concentrations observed in individual banks. Information on business-sector 
concentration of banks is not publicly available, thus central credit registers represent unique 
sources of data on sector concentrations in existing banks. Our emphasis on empirically 
observable sector concentrations is therefore an important contribution.  
We find that economic capital can substantially increase with sector concentration. Its increase 
from a credit portfolio representing the average sector distribution of the German banking 
system to a portfolio that is concentrated in a single sector can be as high as 50%. 
Second, in the theoretical part we evaluate the accuracy of an analytic approximation for 
value-at-risk (VaR) and economic capital (EC) which was proposed in Pykhtin (2004) and 
offers a tractable closed-form solution for the measurement of concentration risk. EC is 
defined as the difference between the VaR and the expected loss of a credit portfolio. We have 
applied a simplified version of the Pykhtin model which further reduces the computational 
burden by requiring the input parameters exposure size and probability of default (PD) only on 
a sector level. Such a methodology could be useful for risk managers and supervisors in search 
of robust, fit-for-purpose tools to measure sector concentration in a bank’s loan portfolio. The 
model allows banks and supervisors to approximate economic capital for loan portfolios 
without running computationally intensive Monte Carlo simulations. 
The methodological framework of the Pykhtin model builds on earlier work by Gordy (2003) 
and Wilde (2001) on granularity adjustments in the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) 
model. Whereas the granularity adjustment deals with an unbalanced exposure distribution 
across names, the Pykhtin model offers a treatment for an unbalanced distribution across 
(correlated) sectors. EC is given in closed form as the sum of the EC in a single risk factor 
model (in which the correlation with the single systematic risk factor depends on the sector) 
and a multi-factor adjustment term. We explore the approximation performance both before 
the multi-factor adjustment is applied and afterwards which means we consider two 
approximation formulae. 
We find that for portfolios with highly granular sectors and homogeneous PDs in every sector, 
both analytic approximation formulae perform extremely well. Moreover, the multi-factor 
adjustment term is relatively small, so that EC in the single risk factor model is already close 
to the true EC values obtained by simulations. Our results hold for portfolios with different 
levels of sector concentration, a different number of sectors as well as under various weights 
of the sector factors (i.e. factor weights sometimes referred to in literature as factor loadings) 
and various assumptions about factor correlations. Furthermore, we explore the accuracy of 
our model when we relax the assumptions that the portfolio is infinitely granular within each 
sector and that all exposures in the same sector have the same PD. We find that the model cp  
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underestimates EC in cases of low granularity, whereas it cp overestimates EC in the presence 
of heterogeneity in individual PDs, in particular if creditworthiness increases with exposure 
size. The resulting errors in EC from both effects together were less than 10% in the cases 
under study. Which of the two effects prevails depends on the specific input parameters. The 
results seem to suggest, however, that for representative credit portfolios, the effect of PD 
heterogeneity is likely to be stronger than the effect of granularity. This implies that the 
analytic approximations err on the conservative side. 
To our knowledge there is only one recent empirical paper that considers the impact of sector 
concentration risk on economic capital.  Burton et al (2005) simulate the distribution of 
portfolio credit losses for a number of real US syndicated loan portfolios. They find that, 
although name concentration can meaningfully increase EC for smaller portfolios (which are 
defined as portfolios with exposures of less than US$10 billion),  sector concentration risk is 
the main contributor to EC for portfolios of all sizes.  
Two other models that measure concentration risk in a tractable model are presented by Garcia 
Cespedes et al (2005) and Düllmann (2006). Garcia Cespedes et al (2005) developed an 
adjustment to the single risk factor model in the form of a scaling factor to the economic 
capital required by the ASRF model. This “diversification factor” is an approximately linear 
function of a Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, calculated from the aggregated sector exposures. 
This model, however, does not allow for different asset correlations across sectors. Contrary to 
the approach in our paper, it cannot distinguish between a portfolio which is highly 
concentrated towards a sector with a high correlation with other sectors, and another portfolio 
which is equally highly concentrated, but towards a sector which is only weakly correlated 
with other sectors. Düllmann (2006) extends Moody's Binomial Expansion Technique by 
introducing default infection into the hypothetical portfolio on which the real portfolio is 
mapped in order to retain a simple solution for VaR.  Unlike the Pykhtin model, the models 
developed by Garcia Cespedes et al and Düllmann require the calibration of parameters using 
Monte Carlo simulations.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the default-mode version of the 
well-established multi-factor CreditMetrics model which serves as a benchmark. Furthermore, 
we discuss the simplified version of the Pykhtin model.  
The empirical part of our paper comprises Sections 3 and 4. The credit portfolios on which the 
empirical analyses are based are described in Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the impact of 
sector concentration on EC by gradually increasing sector concentration, starting from a 
benchmark portfolio.  
In the theoretical part, which comprises Sections 5 to 7, we evaluate the performance of 
Pykhtin’s (2004) analytic approximation for economic capital by comparison with EC 
estimates from Monte Carlo simulations. Section 5 focuses on highly granular portfolios 
which are homogeneous on a sector level and, in particular, on the sensitivity of the results to  
4 
the number of risk factors and correlation figures. Section 6 deals with portfolios characterized 
by lower granularity and Section 7 introduces PD heterogeneity on an exposure level. Section 
8 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Measuring concentration risk in a multi-factor model  
2.1.   General framework  
We assume that every loan in a portfolio can be assigned to a different borrower, so that the 
number of exposures or loans equals the number of borrowers. Each borrower i can uniquely 
be assigned to a single specific sector. In practice, (large) firms often comprise business lines 
from different industry sectors. However, we make this assumption here for practical and 
presentational purposes. Let M denote the number of borrowers or loans in the portfolio,  Ms 
the number of borrowers in sector s,  S  the number of sectors and wsi the weight of the 
exposure of borrower i in sector s relative to the total portfolio exposure. 
The general framework is a multi-factor default-mode Merton-type model.
4 The dependence 
structure between borrower defaults is driven by sector-dependent systematic risk factors 
which are usually correlated. Each risk factor can be uniquely assigned to a different sector, so 
that the number of sectors and the number of factors are the same. Credit risk occurs only as a 
default event at the end of a one-year horizon, which is consistent with traditional book-value 
accounting. The unobservable, normalized asset return Xsi of the i-th borrower in sector s 
triggers the default event if it crosses the default barrier γsi . The corresponding unconditional 
default probability psi is defined as 
() . γ =≤ sis i s i pP X  
The latent variable Xsi follows a factor model and can be written as a linear function of an 
industry sector risk factor  s Y  and an idiosyncratic risk factor  si ε : 
(1a)  
2 1 ε =+ − sis s s s i X rY r  
where  { } 1,..., sS ∈  and  { } 1,..., s iM ∈ . The higher the value of the sector-dependent factor 
weight rs , the more sensitive the asset returns of firm i in sector s are to the sector factor. The 
disturbance term  si ε follows a standard normal distribution. The assumed weight  on the 
idiosyncratic risk guarantees that Xsi has a standard normal distributioni. 
                                                      
4   See also Gupton et al (1997), Gordy (2000), and Bluhm et al (2003) for more detailed information on this type 
of models. The origin of these models can be found in the seminal work by Merton (1974).  
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The correlations between the systematic sector risk factors Ys and Yt are denoted by ρst  and 
are often referred to as factor correlations. The sector factors can be expressed as a linear 


















 for  { } 1,..., sS ∈ . 
The matrix () 1, α
≤≤ st s tS  is obtained from a Cholesky decomposition of the factor correlation 
matrix. The asset correlation ωst for each pair of borrowers in sectors s and t, respectively, can 
be shown to be given by 
(2) 
1
      =   
S
sts t s t s ts n t n
n
rr rr ω ρ αα
=
= ∑ . 
Dependencies between borrowers arise only from their affiliation with the industry sector and 
from the correlations between the systematic sector factors. The intra-sector asset correlation 
for each pair of borrowers is simply the factor weight 
2
s r  squared. 
If a firm defaults, the amount of loss depends on the stochastic loss severity ψ si  whose 
realization is assumed to be known at the time of default. The credit losses of the whole 













where  {.} 1 gives the indicator function. 
We assume the same expected loss severity  [ ] μψ = si E for all borrowers and that all 
idiosyncratic risk in loss severities is diversified away in the portfolio.
5  
In summary, the model needs the following input parameters: 
•  relative exposure size wsi  and default probability psi of the i-th borrower in sector s 
•  the factor correlation matrix and 
•  the sector-dependent factor weight rs 
 
2.2.  The CreditMetrics default-mode model  
To obtain the loss distribution, CreditMetrics applies Monte Carlo simulations by generating 
asset returns and counting the default events. In each simulation run the portfolio loss is 
determined from equation (3). For each exposure, the asset returns for the corresponding 
borrower are generated according to equations (1a/b) and compared with the default threshold, 
                                                      
5   The models analyzed in this paper can also be extended to incorporate idiosyncratic risk in loss severities, if 
required.  
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which can be determined given the borrower's default probability.  If the realized value of the 
asset return falls below the threshold γ si , the borrower is in default. The portfolio loss of a 
simulation run is calculated by adding up the incurred losses from the defaulted borrowers. 
The number of simulation runs in our analyses is typically 200,000. Portfolio losses obtained 
in each simulation run are then sorted to form the distribution of portfolio losses, from which 
EC can be calculated as the difference between the q-quantile of this loss distribution (i.e., the 
VaR) and the expected loss. Since it is obtained by simulation, we refer to it in the following 
as  sim EC . 
2.3.  Analytic EC approximation   
In this section, we describe an analytical approximation to the VaR in the framework of a 
multi-factor model. We use a simplified version of the model developed by Pykhtin (2004). 
The model approximates the VaR in a multi-factor model by adding a “multi-factor” 
adjustment term to the VaR in a single factor model in which the correlation of the firm's asset 
returns with the single factor depends on the firm's sector. The main advantage of this model is 
its tractability, since it does not require Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, we have 
simplified the model in such a way that it only requires exposure size and PD on a sector level 
instead of an individual borrower level. The factor correlation matrix and the factor weights 
are still needed as in the CreditMetrics model. 
On the basis of the work by Gouriéroux et al (2000) and Martin and Wilde (2002), we can 
approximate the portfolio loss L (see equation 3) by a perturbed loss variable 
* LL U η η =+⋅ , 
where 
* L is a random variable constructed such that the q-quantile of its distribution given in 
closed form is close to the q-quantile of the distribution of L.  U is defined as the perturbation 
* − LL  and η is its scaling parameter. 
* L depends on the default probability 
* ˆ() p Y , 
conditional on a single systematic risk factor 
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where cs is the correlation between the systematic risk factor 
* Y  and the asset returns of the 
firms in sector s. In oder to relate relate 
* L  to L, 
* Y  finally needs to be related to the risk 
factors Z1, ...,ZS in the original model. If 
* Y  in (4) is replaced by the realization corresponding 
to the q-quantile  ()
*
q tY, then 
* L  equals the VaR  ()
*
q tL for a confidence level q in the 
asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model with infinitely granular sectors. Note that this 
single risk factor model differs from the well-known ASRF model in that the asset correlation 
cs is determined by the sector to which the borrower belongs. To avoid confusion, we call this  
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model the “ASRF* model”, reserving the term  “ASRF model” for the model with uniform 
asset correlations. 
The q-quantile of the loss distribution, tq(L) can then be approximated by  () η q tL, or as the 
sum of the VaR in the ASRF model 
* () q tL and a multi-factor adjustment  q t Δ . This multi-
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vanishes because we require that 
* L  for all portfolio compositions equals the expected loss 
conditional on 
* Y , that is 
** | ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ LE L Y . By keeping terms up to quadratic order and 
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The first summand in (5) denotes the VaR  ()
*
q tLin the single risk factor model.  The second 
summand denotes the multi-factor adjustment,  q t Δ , which can be calculated according to 
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where  () ly ′  and  () ly ′′  denote, respectively, the first and second derivative of the portfolio 
loss function given by equation (4) and setting 
∗ = Yy .  () vy gives the variance of L 
conditional on 
* = Yy . Its first derivative is  () vy ′ . The details and the inputs of these 
equations are presented in Appendix B. 
The link between L and 
* L  is achieved by restricting 
* Y  to the space of linear mappings of the 







Yb Z . 
                                                      
6     See Pykhtin (2004) for proofs.  
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The correlations between the industry risk factors  s Y  and the systematic risk factor 
* Y  are 
denoted by 
* ρs . These are used to calculate the (also sector-dependent) correlations in the 
ASRF* model using the following mapping function for  { } 1,..., sS ∈ : 
(7) 










Defining cs for  { } 1,..., sS ∈  by (7) ensures that the required equality 
** | ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ LE L Y  holds 
for any portfolio composition.  
There is no unique solution to determine the coefficients  1,..., S bb . In the following, we will 
use the approach in Pykhtin (2004), which is briefly summarized in Appendix C. 
3. Portfolio composition 
3.1.  Data set and definition of sectors 
Our analyses are based on loan portfolios which reflect characteristics of real bank portfolios 
obtained from European credit register data. Our benchmark portfolio represents the overall 
sector concentration of the German banking system and was constructed by aggregating the 
exposure values of loan portfolios of 2224 German banks in September 2004. The sample 
includes branches of foreign banks located in Germany. Credit exposures to foreign 
borrowers, however, are excluded. We deem this to be a reasonable approximation of a 
portfolio characterized by a degree of diversification which banks can on average achieve 
given that it represents the aggregate relative sector exposures of the national banking system. 
In principle, we could also have created a more diversified portfolio in the sense of having a 
lower VaR. However, such a portfolio would be specific to the credit risk model used and 
would not be obtainable for all banks. 
All credit institutions in Germany are required by the German Banking Act 
(Kreditwesengesetz) to report quarterly exposure amounts of those borrowers whose 
indebtedness to them amounts to €1.5 million or more at any time during the three calendar 
months preceding the reporting date. In addition, banks report national codes that are 
compatible with the NACE classification scheme and indicate the economic activity of the 
borrower and his country of residence. Banks are required to aggregate individual borrowers 
for regulatory reporting purposes to borrower units which are linked, for example, by equity 
holdings and constitute an entity sharing roughly the same risk. The aggregation of exposures 
on a business sector level was carried out on the basis of borrower units. If borrowers in the 
same unit belong to different sectors, the dominating exposure amount determines the final 
sector allocation. Therefore, the credit register includes not only exposures above €1.5 million,  
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but also smaller exposures to individual borrowers belonging to a borrower unit that exceeds 
this exposure limit. This characteristic substantially increases its coverage of the credit market. 
The industry classification chosen by CreditMetrics is the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), which was jointly launched by Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) in 1999. The classification scheme was developed to establish a 
global standard for categorizing firms into sectors and industries according to their principal 
business activities. It comprises 24 industries grouped into 10 broad sectors.
7 GICS further 
divides these groups into industries and sub-industries. However, the latter more detailed 
schemes are not used by vendor models. In the following, we use the broad sector 
classification scheme. Because some of the industry groups that form the broad “Industrial” 
sector are very heterogeneous, we decided to split this sector into three industry groups: 
Capital Goods (including Construction), Commercial Services and Supplies, and 
Transportation.
8    
Credit register datasets, however, use the NACE industry classification system, which is quite 
different from the GICS system. In order to use the information from the credit register, we 
mapped
9 the NACE codes onto the GICS codes. Similar mappings are used by other vendor 
models, such as S&P’s  Portfolio Risk Tracker. We have excluded exposures to the financial 
sector (sector G) which comprises exposures to Banks (G1), Diversified Financials (G2), 
Insurance Companies (G3) and Real Estate (G4) because of the specificities of this sector. 
Exposures to the real estate sector are heavily biased as a large number of them are exposures 
to borrowers that are related to the public sector. Since we could not differentiate between 
private and public enterprises in the real estate sector, we have excluded this sector from the 
following analyses. We have also disregarded exposures to households since there is no 
representative stock index for them. This is a typical limitation of models relying on stock 
price returns for the estimation of asset correlations. In sum, we distinguish between 11 
sectors, which can be considered as broadly representing the Basel II asset classes Corporate 
and SMEs. 
3.2.  Comparison with French, Belgian and Spanish banking 
systems 
A rough comparison of the relative share of the sector decomposition between the aggregated 
German, French, Belgian and Spanish banking systems shows that the numbers are similar.
10 
The only noticeable difference is the greater share of the Capital Goods sector (33%) and the 
                                                      
7    See Table 12 in Appendix A, which shows the broad sectors and the more detailed industry groups. 
8   Unreported simulations have shown that results are not affected by using the more detailed classification scheme. 
9    See Table 13 in  Appendix A for the mapping. 
10   The exact figures are provided by Table 14 in Appendix A.   
10
 
smaller share of the Commercial Services and Supplies sector in Spain compared to Germany 
and Belgium. In general, however, the average sector concentrations are very similar across 
the four countries, which suggests that our results are to a large extent  transferable. 































































































































































































(*) A breakdown of Industrial sector C into the three categories Capital Goods, Commercial Services and Supplies, 
and Transportation is not available for France. The sector shares of the aggregated sector C, however, are quite 
similar for all four countries.  
3.3.  Description of the benchmark portfolio 
The sectoral distribution of exposures in the benchmark portfolio, which is shown in Table 1, 
represents the sectoral distribution of aggregate exposures in the German banking system. The 
degree of concentration in this reference portfolio is purely national and driven by the firms' 
sector composition because we do not consider the impact of regional or country factors in our 
analysis. It is not uncommon for banks to use a more detailed sector classification scheme. We 
consider it more conservative to use a relatively broad sector classification scheme rather than 
a very detailed one. In a broad sector classification scheme, a larger proportion of exposures is 
attached to one sector. Therefore, correlations between exposures of the same sector (intra-
sector correlations), which are typically greater than the correlations between exposures of 
different sectors (inter-sector correlations), will play a larger role. 
In order to focus on the impact of sector concentration, we assume an otherwise homogeneous 
portfolio by requiring that all other characteristics of the portfolio are uniform across sectors. 
We assume a total portfolio volume of €6 million that consists of 6,000 exposures of equal 
size which implies a highly granular portfolio in which each exposure represents only 0.017% 
of the total portfolio exposure. Every borrower has a  probability of default (PD) of 2% and 
every exposure is to a different borrower, thus circumventing the need to consider multiple  
 
11
exposure defaults. We set a uniform expected loss severity or loss given default (LGD) of 
45%, which is the corresponding supervisory value for a senior unsecured loan in the 
Foundation IRB approach of the Basel II framework.
11 In the CreditMetrics approach, industry 
weights can be assigned to each borrower according to its participation. Here, we assume that 
every firm is exposed to only one sector as its main activity. Furthermore, we assume banks do 
not reduce exposure to certain sectors by purchasing credit protection. 
Table 1: Composition of the benchmark portfolio (using the GICS sector classification 
scheme) 
 Total  exposure 
Number of 
exposures  % exposure 
A: Energy  11,000  11  0.18% 
B: Materials  361,000  361  6.01% 
C1: Capital Goods  692,000  692  11.53% 
C2: Commercial Services and Supplies  2,020,000  2,020  33.69% 
C3: Transportation  429,000  429  7.14% 
D: Consumer Discretionary  898,000  898  14.97% 
E: Consumer Staples  389,000  389  6.48% 
F: Health Care  545,000  545  9.09% 
H: Information Technology  192,000  192  3.20% 
I: Telecommunication Services  63,000  63  1.04% 
J: Utilities  400,000  400  6.67% 
Total 6,000,000  6,000   
3.4.  Sequence of portfolios with increasing sector concentration 
In order to measure the impact on EC of more concentrated portfolios than the benchmark 
portfolio, we construct a sequence of six portfolios, each with increased sector concentration 
relative to the previous one. To this end, we gradually increase sector concentration in our 
benchmark portfolio by using the following algorithm. In each step we remove x exposures 
from all sectors and add them to a previously selected sector. This procedure is repeated until 
a single-sector portfolio, which is the portfolio with the highest possible concentration, is 
obtained. The sector which receives x exposures at every step and also the amount x that is 
transferred to this sector are determined in such a way that some of the generated portfolios 
reflect a degree of sector concentration that is actually observable in real banks.
12 
Table 2 shows a sequence of seven portfolios in the order of increasing sector concentration. 
The increase in sector concentration is also reflected in the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI),
13 given in the last row which is calculated at sector level. Portfolio 1 has been 
constructed from the benchmark portfolio by re-allocating one third of each sector exposure to 
the sector Capital Goods. The even more concentrated portfolios 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been 
created by repeated application of this rule. Portfolios 2 and 5 are similar to portfolios of 
                                                      
11   See BCBS (2004b). 
12   This procedure for generating a sequence of portfolios with increasing sector concentration is by no means 
unique. Results however are not sensitive to alternative rules of portfolio generation. 




14 insofar as the sector with the largest exposure size has a similar share of the 
total portfolio. Furthermore, the HHI is similar to what is observed in real-world portfolios. 
Finally, we created portfolio 6 with the highest degree of concentration as a one-sector 
portfolio by shifting all exposures to the Capital Goods sector. 
















A: Energy  0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
B: Materials  6%  4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% 
C1: Capital Goods  12%  41% 56% 71% 78% 82%  100% 
C2: Commercial Services & Supplies  34%  22% 17% 11%  8%  7%  0% 
C3: Transportation  7%  5% 4% 2% 2% 1% 0% 
D: Consumer Discretionary  15%  10%  7% 5% 4% 3% 0% 
E: Consumer Staples  6%  4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% 
F: Health Care  9%  6% 5% 3% 2% 2% 0% 
H: Information Technology  3%  2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
I: Telecommunication Services  1%  1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
J: Utilities  7%  4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% 
HHI  17.6  24.1 35.2 51.5 61.7 68.4  1 
3.5.  Intra and inter-sectoral correlations 
Given that asset correlations are usually not observable, we have followed market practice in 
using sample correlations of stock index returns for their estimation. Table 3 shows the 
correlation matrix of the log-returns of those MSCI EMU industry indices which correspond 
to the 11 sectors. The sector factor correlations are based on weekly return data covering the 
period from November 2003 to November 2004. Sectors that are highly correlated with other 
sectors (i.e. sectors that have an average inter-sector correlation of greater than 65%) are 
Materials (B), Capital Goods (C1), Transportation (C3) and Consumer Discretionary (D). 
Sectors that are moderately correlated with other sectors, i.e. sectors that have an average 
inter-sector correlation of between 45% and 65%, are Commercial Services and Supplies (C2), 
Consumer Staples (E) and Telecommunication (I). Sectors that are the least correlated with 
other sectors, i.e. sectors that have an average inter-sector correlation of less than 45%, are 
Energy (A) and Health Care (F). The relative order of these sectors is broadly in line with 
results reported in other empirical papers.
15 The heterogeneity between Capital Goods, 
Commercial Services and Supplies, and Transportation is confirmed by noticeable differences 
in correlations. The intra-sector correlations and/or inter-sector correlations between exposures 
                                                      
14   Confidentiality requires those banks with a high sector concentration remain anonymous. 
15   See, for example, De Servigny and Renault (2001), FitchRatings (2004) and Moody's (2004). It is difficult to 
compare the absolute inter-sector correlation values as different papers report different types of correlations. De 
Servigny and Renault (2001) report inter-sector default correlation values, FitchRatings (2004) reports inter-
sector equity correlations while Moody's (2004) provides correlation estimates inferred from co-movements in 
ratings and asset correlation estimates. Furthermore, the different papers distinguish between a different number 
of sectors.   
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are obtained by multiplying the sector correlations of Table 3 with the sector-dependent factor 
weights, see equation (2). 
 Table 3: Correlation matrix based on MSCI EMU industry indices (based on weekly log 
return data covering the Nov 2003 - Nov 2004 period; in percent) 
 
  A  B  C1  C2  C3  D  E  F  H  I  J 
A: Energy  100  50  42  34  45  46  57  34  10  31  69 
B: Materials    100  87  61  75  84  62  30  56  73  66 
C1:Capital Goods      100  67  83  92  65  32  69  82  66 
C2:Commercial Svs & Supplies        100  58  68  40  8  50  60  37 
C3:Transportation          100  83  68  27  58  77  67 
D: Consumer discretionary            100  76  21  69  81  66 
E: Consumer staples              100  33  46  56  66 
F: Health Care                100  15  24  46 
H: Information Technology                  100  75  42 
I: Telecommunication Services                    100  62 
J: Utilities                      100 
 
More difficult than the estimation of sector correlations is the determination of the factor 
weights, which determine the intra-sector asset correlations. We do not use the formula 
provided in CreditMetrics to compute the factor weights as recent research has suggested that 
this formula does not fit the German data very well.
16 Instead, we assume a unique factor 
weight for all exposures and calibrate the value of the factor weight to match the 
corresponding IRB regulatory capital charge. More precisely, we determine a factor weight 
rs=0.50 for all sectors  { } 1,..., sS ∈  such that the economic capital ECsim of the benchmark 
portfolio equals the IRB capital charge for corporate exposures, assuming a default probability 
of 2%, an LGD of 45% and a maturity of one year. 
Setting the sector factor weight to 0.5 is slightly more conservative than empirical results for 
German companies suggest. The average of all the correlation entries in the factor correlation 
matrix is 0.59, which implies by evoking equation (2) an average asset correlation of 0.14 
between exposures. Empirical evidence
17 has shown that German SMEs typically have an 
average asset correlation of 0.09, which suggests  0.39 s r = . Large firms, however, are 
typically more exposed to systematic risk than SMEs and therefore usually have higher asset 
correlation values.
18 
Equation (2) implies that intra-sector asset correlations are thus fixed at 25%. Inter-sector asset 
correlations can be calculated by multiplying the factor weights of both sectors by the inter-
sector factor correlation. The lowest correlation between the Energy sector index and the 
Information Technology sector index of 10% translates into an inter-sector asset correlation of 
2.5%. The highest correlation occurs between the Commercial Services and Supplies and the 
                                                      
16   See Hahnenstein (2004) for a detailed analysis. 
17   See Hahnenstein (2004). 
18   See, for example, Lopez (2004) for empirical evidence of this relation for the US.  
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Consumer Discretionary sector indices. At 92%, it translates into an inter-sector asset 
correlation of 23%. 
4. Impact of sector concentration on economic capital 
In this section we analyze the impact of increasing sector concentration on economic capital, 
which is defined as the difference between the 99.9% percentile of the loss distribution and the 
expected loss. The results are given in Table 4. We observe for the corporate portfolios that 
economic capital increases from the benchmark portfolio to portfolio 2 by 20%. Economic 
capital for the concentrated portfolio 5 increases by a substantial 37% relative to the 
benchmark portfolio. These results demonstrate the importance of taking sector concentration 
into account when calculating EC. 
Typically, the corporate portfolio comprises only a fraction of the total loan portfolio (which 
also contains loans to sovereigns, other banks and private retail clients). Although the increase 
in sector concentration may have a significant impact on the EC of the corporate credit 
portfolio, it may have a much smaller impact in terms of a bank’s total credit portfolio. For a 
meaningful comparison, we assume that the corporate credit portfolio comprises 30% of the 
total credit portfolio and that the banks need to hold capital amounting to 8% of their total 
portfolio. By assuming that there are no diversification benefits between corporate exposures 
and the bank's other assets, the EC of the total portfolio can be determined as the sum of the 
EC for the corporate exposures and the EC for the remaining exposures. 
Table 4: Impact of sector concentration on economic capital ( sim EC ) for the sequence of  
corporate portfolios and for the sequence of  total portfolios(*) of a bank (in percent) 
  Benchmark 
portfolio  Portfolio 1  Portfolio 2  Portfolio 3  Portfolio 4  Portfolio 5  Portfolio 6 
Corporate  portfolio  7.8  8.8  9.5  10.1 10.3 10.7 11.7 
Total  portfolio  8.0 8.2 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.2 
(*) Total portfolio includes 30% corporate credit and 70% other credit (to retail, sovereign,…) 
 
The results for the total portfolios of the bank are also shown in Table 4. As expected, the 
impact of an increase in sector concentration is much less severe when looking at the EC for 
the total portfolio. Economic capital for portfolio 5, for example, increases by about 16% 
relative to the benchmark portfolio instead of 37% if only the corporate portfolio is taken into 
account. 
In order to verify how robust our results are to the input parameters, we carried out the 
following three robustness checks (RC1 - RC3): 
•  a lower uniform PD of 0.5% instead of 2% for all sectors (RC1), 
•  a different factor correlation matrix (See Table 15, Appendix A) representing the 
correlation matrix with the highest average annual correlation over the period between 
1997 and 2005 (RC2) and  
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•  a uniform intra-sector asset correlation of 15% and a uniform inter-sector asset 
correlation of 6% (RC3), which are values used by Moody’s  for the risk analysis of 
synthetic CDOs.
19 
The results of the three robustness checks are summarized in Table 5. Although the absolute 
level of EC varies between these robustness checks, the relative increase in EC compared with 
the benchmark portfolio is similar to previous results in this section. For Moody’s correlation 
assumptions in RC3, the increase in EC is stronger than for the other robustness checks. This 
can be explained by the larger difference between intra-sector and inter-sector correlations, 
which is justified by the higher number of sectors they use, and which leads to a stronger EC 
increase when the portfolio becomes more and more concentrated in a single sector. We 
conclude that the observed substantial relative increase in EC due to the introduction of sector 
concentration is robust against realistic variation of the input parameters. Furthermore, this 
increase in EC may be even greater, depending on the underlying dependence structure. 
Table 5: EC for the benchmark portfolio and its relative increase for the more concentrated 
portfolios 1 - 6 (in percent of total exposure) 
Portfolio  Using "Initial rule"  RC1: PD=0.5%  RC2: Higher 
correlation  RC3: Moody's 
 EC 
Benchmark 
portfolio  7.8 3.3 8.7 4.0 
  Proportional change of EC in % 
Portfolio 1  +13  +12  +6  +6 
Portfolio  2 +20 +21 +13 +18 
Portfolio  3 +30 +29 +22 +39 
Portfolio  4 +35 +37 +24 +46 
Portfolio  5 +36 +42 +24 +51 
Portfolio  6 +49 +52 +33 +77 
5. Evaluation of the EC approximations for sector-dependent PDs 
and high granularity 
The purpose of this section is to use the model by Pykhtin to calculate EC and to compare 
these EC approximations with the EC obtained from  simulations. In this section we assume  
first homogeneity within each sector and second a highly granular exposure distribution in 
each sector. Because of these two assumptions of our simplified model, the results can be 
understood as an upper bound in terms of approximation quality. We further test the accuracy 
of the EC approximations by varying the sector distributions, the factor correlations, the factor 
weights, the number of factors and the sector PD. Portfolios of coarser granularity and 
heterogeneous PDs on an exposure level are studied in Sections 6 and 7. 
                                                      
19   See Fu et al (2004).  
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•  economic capital in the ASRF* model, which is defined as  ()
**
99.9% =− ECt LE L  
•  economic capital based on the multi-factor adjustment, 
()
*
99.9% 99.9% =+ Δ − MFA EC t L t EL  
•  economic capital  based on Monte Carlo (MC) simulations,  sim EC  
Firstly, we present results for the benchmark portfolio and for the more concentrated portfolios 
1 - 6 in Table 6.  The model parameters are the same as in Section 4. 
Table 6: Comparison of  EC
∗ ,  MFA EC  and  sim EC  for different exposure distributions across 
sectors with increasing sector concentration given a default probability of 2% (in 
percent of total exposure) 
Portfolio  EC
∗
  MFA EC
  sim EC
 
Relative error(*) 
of  MFA EC
 
Benchmark 
portfolio  7.8 7.9 7.8  1.3% 
Portfolio 1  8.7  8.8  8.8  0.0% 
Portfolio 2  9.4  9.4  9.5  -1.1% 
Portfolio 3  10.1  10.1  10.1  0.0% 
Portfolio 4  10.5  10.5  10.3  1.9% 
Portfolio 5  10.7  10.7  10.7  0.0% 
Portfolio 6  11.6  11.6  11.7  -0.9% 
(*) The relative error is defined as the relative difference between  sim EC  and  MFA EC . 
The EC figures for the benchmark portfolio in Table 6 show that EC
∗  and  MFA EC  provide 
extremely accurate proxies for  sim EC . This result suggests that in the given examples the 
calculation of EC
∗  may, in practice, be sufficiently accurate for certain risk-management 
purposes. The four EC estimates for the more highly concentrated portfolios 1 - 6 indicate that 
economic capital increases as expected, but that our results for the approximation performance 
of  EC
∗  and  MFA EC  still hold. According to Table 6, relative errors of MFA EC  are in a 
relatively small range between 0.0% and 1.9%. 
Secondly, we check whether our results differ when we vary the underlying correlation 
structure. To this end, we calculate in Table 7 the three risk measures for different factor 
correlation matrices. More specifically, we assume homogeneous factor correlation matrices in 
which the entries (outside the main diagonal) vary between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.2. The 
last case, in which all factor correlations are equal to one, corresponds to the case of a single-
factor model.  
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Table 7: Comparison of EC
∗ , MFA EC  and  sim EC  for different factor correlations ρ, given a 





  MFA EC
  sim EC
 
Relative error of 
MFA EC  
0.0 3.3 3.9 4.0  -2.5% 
0.2 4.5 4.9 5.0  -2.0% 
0.4 6.1 6.3 6.3  0.0% 
0.6 7.9 7.8 8.0  -2.5% 
0.8 9.7 9.7 9.9  -2.0% 
1.0  11.6 11.6 11.7  -0.8% 
 
Table 7 shows  sim EC  and its proxies EC
∗  and  MFA EC  for increasing factor correlations. As 
expected, economic capital increases with increasing factor correlations, since a higher factor 
correlation reduces the diversification potential by shifting probability mass to the tail of the 
loss distribution. The highest relative error of  MFA EC  of all factor correlations considered is 
2.5% which still reveals a good approximation performance. With increasing factor 
correlations the multi-factor model approaches the structure of a one-factor model for which 
EC
∗  and  MFA EC  coincide. In all cases EC
∗  is relatively close to  MFA EC . Therefore, our 
earlier results concerning the good approximation performance of EC
∗  and  MFA EC  also hold 
under different factor correlation assumptions. 
Thirdly, we vary the value of the factor weight r from 0.2 to 0.8. There is a strong increase in 
EC with the factor weight but this does not affect the approximation quality, neither of EC
∗  
nor of  MFA EC . 
Fourthly, we explore how the results depend on the number of factors. For this purpose we 
vary the number of factors from 2 to 16. Figure 2 shows how EC
∗ ,  MFA EC  and  sim EC  
depend on the number of sectors and the factor correlation.  MFA EC  is only plotted for 2 
sectors because its values are indistinguishable from  sim EC  for 6 and for 16 sectors.  
18 
Figure 2: Economic capital (EC
∗ , MFA EC  and  sim EC ) for different factor correlation values  





































For a given number of sectors, EC increases in Figure 2 with factor correlation as expected. If 
the factor correlation approaches one, then EC values coincide, irrespective of the number of 
sectors. The reason is that in the limiting case of a factor correlation equal to one, the model 
collapses to a single-factor model. 
For a factor correlation of 0.6, which is also the average of the entries in the correlation matrix 
in Table 3, and also for higher factor correlations, the relative approximation error is below 
1% for  MFA EC  and below 2% for EC
∗ . Therefore, the previous results showing a good 
approximation performance of EC
∗  and an even better one for  MFA EC  are found to be robust 
with respect to the number of sectors, at least for realistic factor correlations. 
Figure 2 also shows that EC
∗  and  sim EC  generally decrease when the number of sectors 
increases for given asset correlation values. This result can be explained by risk reduction 
through diversification across sectors. 
Fifthly, we test whether our results for the approximation performance ofEC
∗  and  MFA EC   
are sensitive to PD heterogeneity on a sector level. For this purpose we employ the scaled 




Table 8:  Average historical default rates (1990-2004; before and after scaling to an 
exposure-weighted expected average default rate of 2% for the benchmark portfolio; 
in percent) 
Sector  Unscaled default rate  Scaled default rate 
A: Energy  1.5  1.0 
B: Materials  2.8  1.9 
C1: Capital Goods  2.9  2.0 
C2: Commercial Services and Supplies  3.7  2.5 
C3: Transportation  2.9  2.0 
D: Consumer Discretionary  3.2  2.2 
E: Consumer Staples  3.5  2.4 
F: Health Care  1.6  1.1 
H: Information Technology  2.4  1.6 
I: Telecommunication Services  3.6  2.4 
J: Utilities  0.6  0.4 
Source: own calculation, based on S&P (2004) 
 
The historical default rates in Table 8 are, on average, higher than the value of 2% which is 
used for the PDs in the case of homogeneous PDs for all sectors. In order to isolate the effect 
of PD heterogeneity between sectors, we scale the historical default rate, 
hist
s p , for every 














In this way, we ensure that the weighted average PD of the benchmark portfolio stays at 2% 
even in the case of PD heterogeneity across sectors.  
The results for  sim EC  and the two analytical approximations of EC, using the scaled historical 
default rates as PD estimates, are given in Table 9. 
Table 9: Comparison of EC
∗ ,  MFA EC  and  sim EC (in percent of total exposure), based on 
sector-dependent default probabilities, estimated from historical default rates  
Portfolio  EC
∗
  MFA EC
  sim EC
 




portfolio  8.0 8.0 8.0  0.0% 
Portfolio  1  8.8 8.9 8.8  1.1% 
Portfolio  2  9.4 9.4 9.5  -1.1% 
Portfolio  3  10.1 10.1 10.1 0.0% 
Portfolio  4  10.5 10.5 10.4 1.0% 
Portfolio  5  10.7 10.7 10.7 0.0% 
Portfolio  6  11.6 11.6 11.7  -0.9% 
 
For all risk measures the results in Table 9 are relatively close to those in Table 6. The more 
concentrated the exposures are in one sector, the smaller the difference to Table 6 becomes.  
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This is explained by the fact that the sector PDs are calibrated to an average value of 2%, 
which is also the PD used for Table 6. The approximation quality of EC
∗  and  MFA EC  is 
similar to Table 6. We conclude that, in qualitative terms, the results obtained for a uniform 
PD also hold for heterogeneous sector-dependent PDs. 
6. Evaluation of the EC approximations for sector-dependent PDs 
and low granularity 
Simulation results in the previous section, which reveal a reasonably good approximation 
quality for EC
∗  and  MFA EC , were obtained conditional on a uniform PD in every sector and 
highly granular portfolios. However, portfolios of small banks, in particular, are less granular. 
In the following we explore the impact of lower granularity. From the set of seven portfolios, 
only the benchmark portfolio and portfolio 6 are considered as they have the lowest and the 
highest sector concentration. The impact of granularity is considered for the following two 
cases. 
In the first case, characterized by a portfolio of representative granularity, the distribution of 
exposure size was selected from a sample of typical small, regional German banks to reflect an 
average granularity in terms of the HHI. The purpose is to measure the impact of granularity 
for an exposure distribution that is representative for real banks. However, since the exposure 
distribution is based on central credit register data, only larger exposures are captured
20 in the 
underlying data set with the consequence that this exposure distribution is less granular than 
what we can expect for real bank portfolios. The HHI of the portfolio, measured on single-
exposure level,  is 0.0067 compared with an HHI of 0.001 for the highly granular portfolios 
used in the previous section. Descriptive statistics on exposure size of the new portfolio are 
shown in Table 16 in Appendix D. Unfortunately, the borrower-specific data on exposure size 
contain no sector information.
21 The allocation of exposures to sectors was achieved by 
randomly drawing exposures from the data set under the constraint that the generated 
distribution of exposures across sectors mirrors the sectoral distribution of the benchmark 
portfolio. To control for any sampling bias in the results we repeated this random assignment 
thereby creating several portfolios. These portfolios have the same sector distribution but vary 
in the distribution of individual exposure size in each sector. With these portfolios we verified 
the robustness of the results in this and the following section. 
                                                      
20   See section 3.1 for more information on the characteristics of exposures included in the German central credit 
register. 
21   The reason for this missing information is that we do not use credit register data directly but a matched sample 
of credit register data and a second database which provides us also with individual borrower PDs not included 
in the credit register but required for the analysis of PD heterogeneity in section 7.  
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In the second case, characterized by low granularity,  we consider the highest individual 
exposure shares that are admissible under the EU large exposure rules.
22 In this way, we obtain 
an upper limit for the potential impact of granularity. According to the EU rules, an exposure 
is considered “large” if its amount requires 10% or more of regulatory capital. Banks are 
generally not allowed to have an exposure that requires at least 25% of regulatory capital. 
Furthermore, the sum of all large exposures must not require more than 8 times the regulatory 
capital.
23 
We assume that a bank’s regulatory capital is 8% of its total loan volume.  For a total portfolio 
value of 6,000 currency units, banks are required to hold 480 currency units in capital. Each 
large exposure requires a minimum amount of capital of 48 currency units and a maximum 
amount of 120 currency units. The total sum of all large exposures must not exceed 3,840 
currency units. With these restrictions, the least granular admissible exposure distribution of 
our portfolio consists of 
•  3840/120 = 32 loans of 120 currency units 
•  2160/47 = 45 loan exposures of 47 currency units (just below the large exposure limit 
of 48) and 
•  a remaining single exposure of 45 currency units 
The HHI of this portfolio, measured on a single-exposure level, is 0.015. Since this portfolio is 
charaterized by relatively coarse granularity, its HHI is considerably higher than for the 
portfolio with representative granularity. While keeping the average sector concentration of 
the portfolio constant, we increase the granularity of the portfolio to reflect the exposure size 
distribution of this least granular portfolio. More details of this portfolio can be found in Table 
17, Appendix D.  
Economic capital from simulations,  sim EC , and the analytic proxies 
* EC  and  MFA EC  are 
given in Table 10. 
Table 10: Comparison of EC
∗ ,  MFA EC  and  sim EC  (in  percent of total exposure ) for 
portfolios with representative and low granularity using sector-dependent default 
probabilities  
Portfolio  Granularity  EC
∗
  MFA EC
  sim EC
 





representative 8.0  8.0  8.6  -7% 
  low 8.0 8.0 9.3  -14% 
Single sector 
portfolio 
low 11.6 11.6 12.7 -8% 
 
                                                      
22   See Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 
23   The last two restrictions may be breached with permission of the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin), in which case the excess must be fully backed by capital.  
22 
 
The  sim EC  value of 9.3% for the low granular benchmark portfolio is 1.3 percentage points 
(or 14% in relative terms) higher than for the highly granular benchmark portfolio in Table 9. 
This difference appears to be substantial, but we have to consider that the granularity of the 
portfolio in Table 10 is very low since it reflects the lowest granularity permissible under 
European bank regulation.  sim EC  for the single sector portfolio 6 in Table 10 is higher than 
for the benchmark portfolio,  which is consistent with earlier reported results. 
The  sim EC  value of 8.6% for the benchmark portfolio with representative granularity is 
relatively close to the value of 9.3% for the portfolio with low granularity, at least if compared 
with  sim EC  of 8.0% for the infinitely granular benchmark portfolio in Table 9. One reason is 
that some exposures in the portfolio with representative granularity technically violate the 
large exposure rules.
24 Therefore, as mentioned before, the portfolio of “representative” 
granularity should still be regarded as conservative in terms of granularity. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the approximation errors of the EC proxies, 
* EC  and  MFA EC , 
are more important than the level of EC. Both EC proxies are based on the assumption of 
infinite granularity in each sector, while the  sim EC  calculations take granularity into account. 
We find that 
* EC  and  MFA EC  can substantially underestimate EC by up to 14%, in particular 
for portfolios with coarse granularity . 
7. Evaluation of EC approximations for heterogeneous sectors 
So far we have only considered sector-dependent PDs, which means PD variation on a sector 
level, but not on the exposure level. In the following we explore the impact of heterogeneous 
PDs inside a sector together with the impact of granularity. For the benchmark portfolio of 
representative granularity analyzed in the previous section, we also have individual borrower 
PDs which were computed from a logit model based on firms’ accounting data. In order to 
apply the logit model, borrower information from the central credit register on exposure size 
had to be matched with a balance sheet database, also maintained by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.
25 Using empirical data on exposure size and PD automatically captures a 
potential dependence between these two characteristics. 
                                                      
24   This can be explained either by special BaFin approval or, most likely, by data limitations given that our credit 
register data do not contain loans below €1.5 million. The latter implies that their sum is lower than the total 
portfolio exposure of the data-providing real bank and, therefore, our relative exposure weights are biased 
upwards. In other words, it is well possible that the large exposure limit is breached for our portfolio, although 
the limit is still met by the data-providing bank. 
25   More details on the database and the logit model that was used to determine the PDs can be found in Krüger et 
al. (2005).  
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In order to guarantee comparability with previous results, we apply the same scaling procedure 
as in Section 6 to ensure that the exposure-weighted average PD in each sector is the same as 
the corresponding scaled default rate given inTable 8. Information on this PD distribution is 
given in Table 18, Appendix D. 
The portfolio with the lowest granularity admissible under the EU large exposure rules is an 
artificially generated portfolio, so that we have no PD information for single exposures. 
Therefore, we randomly assign PDs from an empirical aggregate PD distribution based on the 
same balance sheet database, but this time aggregated over a sample of banks. The empirical 
PD distribution is given in Table 20 and information on the PD distribution of the low granular 
portfolio is provided in Table 19, Appendix D.
26 
The results for PD heterogeneity in every sector are given in Table 11. The reduction of 
sim EC  compared to Table 10, which occurs for both portfolios, is due to the PD heterogeneity 
on the exposure level. This impact of PD heterogeneity has also been noted by Hanson et al 
(2005) and can be explained by the concavity of the dependence of EC on PD.  
Table 11: Comparison of EC
∗ ,  MFA EC  and  sim EC  for portfolios with heterogeneous sectors 
(in percent of total exposure) 
Portfolio  Granularity  EC
∗
  MFA EC
  sim EC
 





representative 8.0  8.0  7.7  +4% 
  low 8.0 8.0 8.5 -6% 
Single sector 
portfolio 
low 11.6 11.6 10.8  +8% 
 
Since  EC
∗  and  MFA EC  do not account for PD heterogeneity on the exposure level, these 
values stay unchanged from Table 10 while  sim EC  decreases. As a consequence, the 
underestimation by using  EC
∗  and  MFA EC  instead of  sim EC  is reduced relative to Table 10, 
or even reversed to an overestimation of EC. This is confirmed by the approximation error in 
the last column of Table 11, which is lower when using heterogeneous PDs compared to the 
case of sector-dependent PDs in Table 10.  
For the single-sector portfolio and the benchmark portfolio with representative granularity, the 
approximation errors of the EC proxies are positive, implying that the effect of PD 
heterogeneity is stronger than the granularity effect, measured relative to the highly granular 
portfolio with homogeneous sector PDs. As a consequence, the EC  proxies provide   
conservative estimates. Comparing the conservativeness of the single-factor portfolio and the 
                                                      
26   Since a negative correlation between exposure size and PD emerged as a stylized fact in recent empirical 
literature (See, for example, Dietsch and Petey (2002) or Lopez (2004)), we also considered the case that the 
PDs are perfectly ordered in terms of decreasing exposure size. We found that our results are robust in this case.  
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benchmark portfolio in Table 11, we observe that the degree of overestimation halves from 
+8% to +4%. This suggests further robustness checks, in particular for portfolios with a higher 
number of sectors. 
In summary, the approximation errors for all portfolios considered vary between -6% and 
+8%. The results of Table 10 and Table 11 taken together demonstrate that the effect of PD 
heterogeneity counterbalances the effect of granularity. In general it is not possible to 
determine which of the two opposing effects dominates. For the portfolio with a representative 
granularity in Table 11, the effect of granularity is arguably weaker, which suggests that for 
portfolios of “average granularity” in real banks, PD heterogeneity would tend to 
overcompensate the granularity effect and EC
∗  and  MFA EC  would provide conservative 
estimates.  
Further empirical work is warranted to confirm this indicative result. 
Our analysis has shown that PD heterogeneity on the exposure level improves the performance 
of the analytic EC approximations relative to the situation of a granular portfolio with (only) 
sector-dependent PDs. The reason is that PD heterogeneity reduces the underestimation of EC 
that is caused by the granularity of the portfolio. This effect is even stronger if larger 
exposures or firms have lower PDs than smaller ones. Furthermore, PD heterogeneity appears 
not to affect the relative difference between  MFA EC  and 
* EC . 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The minimum capital requirements for credit risk in the IRB approach of Basel II implicitly 
assume that credit portfolios of banks are well diversified across business sectors. Potential 
concentration risk in certain business sectors is covered by Pillar 2 of the Basel II Framework, 
which comprises the supervisory review process.
27 To what extent the regulatory minimum 
capital requirements can understate economic capital is an empirical question. In this paper we 
provide a tentative answer by using data from the German central credit register. Credit risk is 
measured by economic capital in a multi-factor asset value model and determined by Monte 
Carlo simulations.  
In order to measure the impact of concentration risk on economic capital, we start in the 
empirical part with a benchmark portfolio that reflects the aggregate exposure distribution 
across sectors of the German banking system. Since the exposure distributions across business 
sectors are similar in Belgium, France and Spain, we expect that our main results also hold for 
other European countries. Starting with the benchmark portfolio, we have successively 
increased sector concentration, considering degrees of sector concentration which are 
observable in real banks. The most concentrated portfolio contained exposures only to a single  
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sector. Compared with the benchmark portfolio, economic capital for the concentrated 
portfolios can increase by almost 37% and by 50% in the case of a one-sector portfolio. We 
have subjected our results to various robustness checks. We find that the increase in economic 
capital may be even greater, contingent on the dependence structure. This result clearly 
underlines the necessity to take inter-sector dependency into account for the measurement of 
credit risk.  
Since concentration in business sectors can substantially increase economic capital, a tractable 
and robust calculation method for economic capital which avoids the use of computationally 
burdensome Monte Carlo simulations is desirable. For this purpose the theoretical part 
evaluates the accuracy of a model developed by Pykhtin (2004), which provides an analytical 
approximation of economic capital in a multi-factor framework. We have applied a simplified, 
more tractable version of the model which requires only sector-aggregates of exposure size, 
PD and expected loss severity. The dependence structure is captured by the correlation matrix 
of the original multi-factor model.  Furthermore, we have evaluated the extent to which EC
∗ , 
as the first of two components in the analytic approximation of economic capital, already 
provides a reasonable proxy of economic capital. EC
∗  refers to the economic capital for a 
single-factor model in which the sector-dependent asset correlations are defined by mapping 
the richer correlation structure of the multi-factor model. The benchmark for the 
approximation quality is always the economic capital figure of the original multi-factor model 
which is obtained from MC simulations. 
We have shown that the analytic approximation formulae perform very well for portfolios 
with highly granular and homogeneous sectors. This result holds for portfolios with different 
sector concentrations and for various factor weights and correlation assumptions. Furthermore, 
we have found that EC
∗  is relatively close to the simulation-based economic capital for most 
of the realistic input parameter tupels considered. 
Finally, we explore the robustness of our results against the violation of two critical model 
assumptions, namely infinite granularity in every sector and sector-dependent PDs. We find 
that coarser granularity and PD heterogeneity (on the single exposure level) have 
counterbalancing effects on the performance of the analytic approximations for economic 
capital. Coarser granularity induces the analytic approximation formulae to have a downward 
bias which increases to 14% in extreme cases of portfolios with the lowest granularity 
permissible by EU large exposure rules, depending on the sector structure of the portfolio. 
Replacing sector-dependent PDs by heterogeneous PDs on the individual exposure level 
reduces economic capital, but does not affect the analytic approximations. As a consequence, 
the downward bias decreases. The relative error of the analytic approximation, measured 
                                                                                                                                                         
27   See BCBS (2004b), paragraphs 770-777.  
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relative to the simulation-based economic capital figure, lies in a range between –6% and 
+8%, dependent on the exposure distribution across sectors and the number of factors. In 
summary, we find that heterogeneity in individual PDs and low granularity partly balance each 
other in their impact on the performance of the analytic approximations. Which effect prevails 
depends on the specific input parameters. Indicative results suggest that in representative 
credit portfolios, PD heterogeneity will at least compensate for the granularity effect, which 
suggests that the analytic formulae approximate economic capital reasonably well and err on 
the conservative side. 
In the cases studied, it is possible to use the analytic economic capital approximations of the 
simplified Pykhtin model without sacrificing much accuracy. This is an important result as it 
suggests, pending further robustness checks, that supervisors and banks can reasonably well 
approximate their economic capital for their credit portfolio by a relatively simple formula and 
without running computationally burdensome Monte Carlo simulations. 
Further research seems to be warranted, particularly in further advancing Pykhtin’s 
methodology in a direction which improves its approximation accuracy while staying 
parsimonious in terms of data requirements. This could be achieved, for example, by exploring 
alternative ways to map the correlation matrix of the multi-factor model into sector-dependent 
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Table 12: GICS Classification Scheme: Broad Sector and Industry Groups 
A: Energy  A1:  Energy 
B: Materials  B1: Materials 
C: Industrial  C1: Capital goods 
  C2: Commercial Services and Supplies 
 C3:  Transportation 
D: Consumer Discretionary  D1: Automobiles and Components 
  D2: Consumer Durables and Apparel 
  D3: Hotels, Restaurants and Leisure 
 D4:  Media 
 D5:  Retailing 
E: Consumer Staples  E1: Food and Drug Retailing 
  E2: Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
  E3: Household and Personal Products 
F: Health Care  F1: Health Care Equipment and Services 
  F2: Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 
G: Financials  G1: Banks 
  G2: Diversified Financials 
 G3:  Insurance 
  G4: Real estate 
H: Information Technology  H1: Software and Services 
  H2: Technology Hardware & Equipment 
  H3: Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 
I: Telecommunication Services  I1: Telecommunication Services 
J: Utilities  J1: Utilities 
 
Table 13: Mapping NACE codes to GICS codes 
2 (or more) -digit code  Description  Mapped to GICS 
1  Agriculture and hunting  E 
2 Forestry  B 
5 Fishing  E 
10 Coal    mining  B 
11  Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction  A 
12  Mining of uranium and thorium  B 
13  Mining of metal ores  B 
14  Other mining and quarrying  B 
15  Food and beverages manufacturing  E 
16 Tobacco  manufacturing  E 
17 Textile  manufacturing  D 
18 Textile  products  manufacturing  D 
19  Leather and leather products manufacturing  D 
20 Wood  products  D 
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  B 
22  Publishing and printing  C2 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  A  
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24 (excl 244)  Chemicals and chemical products manufacturing  B 
244 Pharmaceuticals  F 
25  Rubber and plastic manufacturing  D 
26  Other non-metallic mineral products  B 
27 Basic  metals  manufacturing  B 
28 Fabricated  metal  manufacturing  B 
29  Machinery and equipment manufacturing  C1 
30  Office machinery and computers manufacturing   H 
31  Electrical machinery manufacturing  H 
32  TV and communication equipment manufacturing  H 
33  Medical and optical instruments manufacturing  F 
34 Car  manufacturing  D 
35  Other transport equipment manufacturing  D 
36 Furniture  manufacturing  D 
37 Recycling  J 
40  Gas and electricity supply  J 
41 Water  supply  J 
45 Construction  C1 
50  Car sales, maintenance and repairs  D 
51   Wholesale trade   C2 
52 (excl 5211, 522,523)  Retail trade  D 
522, 523  Consumer staples   E 
55  Hotels and restaurants  D 
60 Land  transport  C3 
61 Water  transport  C3 
62 Air  transport  C3 
63  Transport supporting activities and travel agencies  C3 
64  Post and telecommunication  I 
65 Financial  institutions  G1 
66 Insurance  G3 
67  Support to financial institutions  G1 
70 Real  estate  G4 
71  Machinery and equipment leasing manufacturing  C1 
72  Computer and related activities  H 
85  Health care and social work  F 
90  Sewage and refuse disposal  J 





Table 14: Comparison of sector concentrations, aggregated exposure values over banks in 
Germany, France, Belgium and Spain 
Sector Germany  France  Belgium  Spain 
A1: Energy  0.18%  0.88%  0.05%  1,05% 
B1: Materials  6.01%  3.97%  7.45%  9,34% 
C: Industrial
28  52.36% 63.82% 54.77% 48,53% 
C1: Capital Goods  11.53%    9.89%  32,90% 
C2: Commercial Services and 
Supplies  33.69%  37.74%  10,20% 
C3: Transportation  7.14%    7.14%  5,43% 
D: Consumer Discretionary  14.97%  11.91%  15.77%  18,60% 
E: Consumer Staples  6.48%  7.21%  7.05%  10,20% 
F: Health Care  9.09%  5.00%  5.64%  1,85% 
H1: Software and Services  3.20%  1.47%  1.86%  1,99% 
I1: Telecommunication Services  1.04%  1.91%  0.54%  2,67% 
J1: Utilities  6.67%  3.82%  6.87%  5,77% 
 
Table 15: Correlation matrix based on MSCI EMU industry indices (based on weekly log 
return data covering the Nov 2002 - Nov 2003 period; in percentages). 
 
  A  B  C1  C2  C3  D  E  F  H  I  J 
A: Energy  100  62  66  43  62  67  78  70  50  47  72 
B: Materials    100  91  78  77  85  73  69  74  68  69 
C1:Capital Goods      100  76  80  92  74  68  81  72  75 
C2:Commercial Svs & Supplies        100  66  81  58  53  71  58  52 
C3:Transportation          100  78  68  59  70  65  64 
D: Consumer discretionary            100  71  66  86  72  70 
E: Consumer staples              100  75  62  60  70 
F: Health Care                100  55  44  70 
H: Information Technology                  100  69  58 
I: Telecommunication Services                    100  67 
J: Utilities                      100 
                                                      
28 Aggregate of C1, C2 and C3 only used for comparison with French data. Not used in the analysis.  
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where y denotes the single systematic risk factor. 
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The factor weight in the ASRF* model is denoted by cs which can be written as 
* ρ = s ss cr 
where
* ρs denotes the correlation between the composite sector factor  s Y  and the systematic 
factor 
* Y  in the ASRF* model. 
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where  () 2 N   denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate-normal 
distribution and 
Y
st ω  has the meaning of a conditional asset correlation for two exposures in 
sectors t and s, conditional on 
* Y . This conditional asset correlation  can be written as 
( )( )
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In Pykhtin (2004) the coefficients  1,..., S bb are obtained by maximizing the correlation 
between 
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λ is the Lagrange multiplier chosen to satisfy the constraint. Again, there is no unique solution 



















Table 16: Descriptive statistics of exposure distribution of a portfolio of 11 sectors, 
representative in terms of granularity 





1 1 1  NA  1.2  NA  1.2 
2 36 0 1.3  4.7  8.9  43.2 
3 69 0 2.2  6.1  12.8  127.6 
4 203 0 1.7  5.3  10.5  152.3 
5 43  0.1  2.1  5.4  10.5  60.0 
6 90 0 1.4  5.1  9.3  112.2 
7 39  0.1  1.3  4.9  10.0  42.2 
8 55  0.2  1.8  4.8  11.3  74.2 
9 19  0.1  0.7  3.6  5.8  22.0 
10  6  0.2 0.6 3.0 7.8 8.5 




Table 17: Descriptive statistics of exposure distribution of a low granular portfolio of 11 
sectors 





1  1  11 NA 11 NA 11 
2  8  32 47 47 47 47 
3  6  92  120 120 120 120 
4  17  100 120 120 120 120 
5 10 6 47  47  47  47 
6  8  58  120 120 120 120 
7  9  13 47 47 47 47 
8 9  33  47  47  47  120 
9 5 4  47  47  47  47 
10 2 16  16  31.5  47  47 
11  9  24 47 47 47 47 
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Table 18: Scaled PD distribution of a portfolio of 11 sectors, representative in terms of 
granularity 





1  1  1.0% NA 1.0% NA 1.0% 
2  36  0.0% 0.3% 0.6% 1.2% 7.4% 
3  69  0.1% 0.9% 1.6% 2.9%  21.8% 
4  203  0.0% 0.9% 1.7% 3.4%  15.5% 
5  43  0.0% 0.8% 1.8% 2.7% 6.0% 
6  90  0.1% 1.1% 2.2% 3.6%  14.0% 
7  39  0.0% 0.9% 1.6% 3.3%  11.1% 
8  55  0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 2.0% 5.6% 
9  19  0.0% 0.4% 1.1% 1.6% 4.1% 
10  6  1.0% 2.2% 3.4% 4.1% 5.9% 
11  40  0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 2.2% 
 
Table 19: Scaled PD distribution of a low granular portfolio of 11 sector 





1  1  1.0% NA 1.0% NA 1.0% 
2  8  0.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 4.2% 
3  6  0.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 5.1% 
4  17  0.1% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 5.9% 
5  10  0.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 4.9% 
6  8  0.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 4.7% 
7  9  0.1% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 5.8% 
8  9  0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 2.4% 
9  5  0.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 3.9% 
10  2  2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
11  9  0%  0.3% 0.3% 0.3%  1% 
 
Table 20: Quality distribution of German firms in the Bundesbank database 
Rating grade  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
Share in percent  2  6  11  55  24  2 
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